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THE CULTURE OF DECISION-MAKING:
A CASE FOR JUDICIAL DEFIANCE
THROUGH EVIDENCE AND FACT-FINDING
DR. CAROLINE FENNELL*
A task recently identified by Professor Andrew
Ashworth in the context of the criminal law was that of the
search of features for a model of criminal laws
that is more principled, conceptually more
coherent, and constitutionally and politically
more appropriate.1
The rules of evidence traditionally receive their
strictest application in the criminal context, being more easily
waived or set aside by the parties in the civil context and
tribunals. Some of the rules have been given a constitutional
home in this jurisdiction, however, and so are not, ostensibly,
so easily departed from. A core of the rules is seen to
correlate to fairness, and may be seen to be wedded
domestically to a constitutional, and indeed transnationally to
a Convention concept of ‘fair trial’. Although the European
Court of Human Rights, for instance, allows countries
latitude with regard to their domestic rules of evidence (“The
admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation
by national law”2), certain basic principles such as the
presumption of innocence, and the right to silence, are
guaranteed under Article 6. Hence the legal burden of proof
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2 Windisch v. Austria (1990) 13 E.H.R.R. 281.
1
 Ashworth, “Is the criminal law a lost cause?” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 255 at
255.
*
 B.C.L. (N.U.I.), LL.M. (Osgoode Hall), B.L., Ph.D. (University of
Wales), Statutory Lecturer, University College Cork. This article is based
on a paper given at the National Judicial Conference in November 2001.
cannot normally be placed on the accused, nor silence
criminalised.3
Certain rules of evidence reveal themselves on
examination to be self-evidently ‘political’ or policy driven -
the rules on admissibility of real or confession evidence in
the aftermath of police breach of pre-trial process for
example. High water marks here would be the Irish courts’
decisions in Kenny4 and Ward.5 Other rules may be viewed
simply as ‘adjectival law’, so remaining hidden in terms of
influence, or regarded as a matter of ‘common-sense’. That
unquestioning acceptance of certain rules regarding fact
finding and credibility, in particular, merits exploration in
terms of its relationship to popular culture and sentiment in
the world around us. In searching for a model of evidence
that is principled and coherent, it may prove useful to square
the application of rules in certain contexts with a central
unifying concept of fair trial. How that concept evolves over
both context and time, as revealed through our treatment of
evidence may raise questions - and provide tentative
answers-to what might ground our evidentiary rules.
I. (RE)CONSTRUCTING THE ‘LAW STORY’: THE ROLE OF POPULAR
CULTURE
The symbolic trial is viewed as a signifier
within the dominant legal culture: it is a forum
that projects authoritative messages through
language and legal form about identity and
social relationships in a struggle between the
26 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
5 D.P.P. v. Ward (Special Criminal Court, unreported, Barr J., 27
November 1998).
4 D.P.P. v. Kenny [1990] 2 I.R. 110; [1990] I.L.R.M. 569.
3 R v. Lambert [2001] 3 W.L.R. 206; Heaney & McGuinness v. Ireland
Jgt. 21 Dec. 2000 [2001] Crim LR 481; Quinn v. Ireland jgt. Dec 21 2000
antagonistic world views of the defence and
the prosecution.6
Cultural nuances dictate how we assess information.
Less well appreciated may be the fact that as such nuances
change over time, rules relating to relevance, fact
determination or credibility, when fossilised in law, can be
found to contain the vestiges of another age, ill-suited to the
current climate. This distillation of assumptions regarding
veracity into law, and subsequent application to assessments
of credibility and fact-finding at trial, prove powerful
determinants of guilt or innocence. Solidified as evidentiary
rules, these assumptions become part of legal culture, and
may prove themselves difficult to uproot, even in face of
legislative reform. Several jurisdictions, for example, have
attempted to reform corroboration rules, both as to the need
for a warning at all (Canada and the United Kingdom7 in the
case of accomplices); or its mandatory application in certain
cases (Ireland8 in relation to sexual offence victims and
children).9 Similarly, rape shield rules were introduced in
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9
 At the time the changes were introduced in relation to sexual offences,
they were unsurprising, given originating rationale(s) such as Wigmore’s
suggestion that every sexual offence complainant should be subjected to
psychiatric examination before being allowed to testify, general
assumptions regarding the veracity of women in rape cases, or the
supposed hierarchy of trustworthiness between different types of sex
offence victims. See further Fennell, “Differential Treatment of Sexual
Complainants by the Law of Evidence: A Case for Reform” (1987) 22 Ir.
8
 Section 27 of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act, 1992; section 7 of
the Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act, 1990.
7
 Section 31(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994
abolished the corroboration warnings where a person is an accomplice or
the offence a sexual offence. See further Birch, “Corroboration: Goodbye
to All That” [1995] Crim. L.R. 524. In Canada the Supreme Court
abandoned the corroboration requirement in relation to accomplices in
Vetrovec v. R. [1982] 136 D.L.R. (3d) 89.
6
 Bumiller, “Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against
Women in Legal Culture” (1990) 18 International Journal of the
Sociology of Law 125, 126.
many jurisdictions, including England and Ireland, to exclude
previously admissible evidence of past sexual history.10
It has been demonstrated that, initially at least, the
judiciary may not fully implement the effect of these changes,
particularly where their discretion remains.11 This may
particularly be the case where the rules were creatures of
their own development. The manner in which legal culture
develops, absorbs and discards these rules, whether they are
the momentary products of the vagaries of popular and hence
legislative or judicial sentiment, or a reaction against them,
reveals how evidentiary rules develop and fact finding
operates. It may be self-evident that legal adjudication within
the criminal process carries elements of individual or
situational bias, inequity of bargaining power, inevitable error
due to human fallibility and forensic inaccuracy. However
locating the rules of evidence in the context of their
application may help ascertain if fact-finding and fairness are
a product of current prejudice and norm. 
There is more to evidence and adjudication12 than the
pursuit of accuracy. Adjudicative decisions are not only about
‘what happened’ as Nicolson13 points out, in that they also
28 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
13
 Nicolson, “Truth, Reason and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in
Evidence Discourse” [1994] M.L.R. 726.
12
 Jonakait, “Making the Law of Factual Determinations Matter More”
[1992] 25(3) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 673, 688: “Evidence law
is only a small part of the much larger fact-determination system… We
need to be scholars of the fact-determination, not just of evidence. The
accurate determination of facts is crucial to justice, and we need to
explore all the possibilities that can affect that accuracy.”
11
 Adler, “The Relevance of Sexual History Evidence in Rape: Problems
of Subjective Interpretation” [1985] Crim.L.R. 769.
10
 In England s. 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976
provided a shield with regard to past sexual history with third parties. In
Ireland section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act, 1981 provided a shield
in relation to past sexual history with third parties, while s. 13 of the
Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990 extended that shield to also
cover past sexual history with the accused.
Jur. (n.s.) 228.
communicate a number of truths of a more overtly moral and
political nature. It is that communication between trial and
culture which lies at the heart of this exploration of
evidentiary rules.
Changing societal needs, such as an upswing in the
number of sexual abuse/offence cases can lead to a greater
belief in such witnesses. Similarly an upsurge in organised
crime, and use of a State Witness Protection programme, has
implications for the acceptability of accomplice evidence.14
In contrast revelations of miscarriages of justice can lead to a
corresponding suspicious attitude to confession evidence. In
that sense, the system is demonstrably vulnerable to
prevailing shifts in public opinion as to the manner in which
we do ‘justice’. But fact-finding itself is also more
immediately and inevitably influenced by the popular cultural
view of the ‘tale’ being reconstructed in the courtroom.
This is seen in the way lawyers may use stories to
organise their presentation of evidence, and in that sense the
popular tale with contemporary currency may find its way
into the reconstruction which is the trial. The jury is also an
obvious conduit for such transference.15 Indeed trial by a jury
of one’s peers in situations where tempers are running high in
a small locale, can give new and harsh meaning to the
concept of ‘community’ justice. 16On a broader canvass,
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16
 “Out of the Frying Pan or into the Fire? Race and Choice of Venue
After Rodney King” (1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 722. Garcia advises
15
 Jackson and Doran, “Judge and Jury: Towards a New Division of
Labour in Criminal Trials” [1997] M.L.R. 759, at 763: “It is commonly
suggested that lawyers use stories to organise evidence, but the actual
presentation of evidence in trials does not conform easily to a coherent
normative structure. Juries too will construct stories from the evidence
and will test the plausibility of such stories by reference to common sense
generalisations.”
14
 In the Ward Case, for example, rejection and disbelief of the police and
confession here combined with belief of the accomplice and refusal to
‘upgrade’ that doubt regarding accomplices in the case of WPP
participants - hence strengthening the credibility of ‘ordinary’
accomplices.
society at large may mark as particularly reprehensible at any
time a particular type of crime, rendering trial of those
individuals more visible and marked. In support of this is the
finding by Jackson and Doran of a prevalent view among
counsel that sexual cases are particularly difficult to defend
before juries.17 Of course, one of the reasons for juries is
precisely this ability to channel ‘community values’ into the
decision making process.18 But that has implications in terms
of their role in the criminal justice system. Jackson and Doran
suggest that judges may have the edge in emotionally charged
cases such as sexual offences, where the legal scales on the
eyes of lawyers help stop the high beam of politics and media
discourse.19 The media is then a significant player here.
Those who are involved in decision making in the
criminal process, most particularly the jury, are interpreting
the tales told to them in accordance with a background and
criteria imbued with popular images and the interpretations of
the media. Farrel Corcoran makes the point that all media are
(sic) about the making of public meanings:
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19
 Hence defence lawyers in these cases might well like the option of a
non-jury trial. Jackson & Doran argue for roles for both judge and jury in
fact finding: “In the absence of any perfect line of communication to
‘how it happened’, triers of fact must play a part in bringing their own
experiences, their own ‘evidence’, to bear on the case." (1997) 60 Modern
Law Review 759, 778.
18
 Jackson and Doran (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 759, 764 and 766.
17
 Jackson and Doran, “Judge and Jury: Towards a New Division of
Labour in Criminal Trials” (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 759.
close scrutiny of jury composition: “The rules of evidence are a child of
the jury system, yet we seldom focus on the issues of jury composition
and jury selection in evidence courses. We should. We can. Selection
strategies depend heavily on the particulars of a specific case, such as the
nature of the charge, what the evidence shows, who the witnesses are,
who the defendant is, who the lawyers are, and who else is in the jury
pool. It is not enough to read about empirical studies in the abstract. We
should think about these issues in the context of a particular case.”
Garcia, “Rape, Lies and Videotape”, 25(3) Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review 711, 736-737.
The media intimately affect our thoughts and
actions because they have the power to decide
what is important in the public sphere, to set
the agenda, to light up certain events and keep
others in darkness. They have the power to
define the world in a particular way, to
establish a partial (maybe even a bespoke)
point of view as universal common sense, not
to be questioned.
The influence of the subtext of the crime debate here
is what is operating here. Very often procedural changes with
regard to evidentiary rules comprise legislative initiatives
introduced in response to 'public pressure' on a particular
issue. These changes may initially experience limitations in
terms of their effect. Althouse,20 for example, points out in
relation to the rape shield rules that21 initial generous
interpretation of exceptions to the rape shield rules can
substantially influence the impact of the rule.22 However,
ultimately “[t]he way people think about the evidence they
hear is more important than any rule”,23 and accordingly,
Althouse sees the rape shield rules importance as lying in its
value as a “cultural phenomenon”. It matters in her view as a
film or a famous rape case matters, as  “…a cultural
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 (1992) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 757, 768.
22
 “Thus, if the judge thinks the evidence of past sexual behaviour has
strong probative value, it becomes more likely that the right to confront the
witness or the process right to present evidence will require its admission.”
(1992) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 757, 765.
21
 Althouse points out that at the level of interpretation and application a
rule’s purpose can be skewed. “One cannot simply rely on the promise of
the rule because a judge or jury that does not share the goals and beliefs
embodied in the rule can drastically undercut its effect.” (1992) Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review 757, 764.
20
 Althouse, “Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules
Matter?” (1992) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 757.
phenomenon that shapes the minds of the judges and juries
who decide the outcomes of trials.”24
In similar fashion the media’s presentation of criminal
events, or identification of a perpetrator of a particular crime,
fashions amongst its audience a knee-jerk response to that
class. Consider the difficulty of establishing a case for the
defence that has cultural meaning or significance in relation
to battered women who kill, where, as Edwards remarks “the
nagging husband does not have the same cultural meaning”,25
yet “when building up the case for the defence the scene
constructed must be one capable of convincing a jury of the
congruence between social and legal accounts”.26
The very manner in which the law, lawyers and courts
operate invokes orthodoxy and exclusion as “…law restricts,
confines and places into hierarchy those who may speak the
discourse, the texts of the discourse and the settings where
legal discourse takes place.” 27 There are other constraints
that may not be so apparent. Prior to the trial itself, the
investigative process is circumscribed, as the police have
impacted upon what is presented to (and further
(mis)interpreted by) the courts. As Zuckerman points out:
The police case does not contain just raw
objective facts. The police construct and
present an entire picture of reality which is
interlaced with evaluative conclusions (such as
the description of the conduct to fit a
particular legal definition), with evidence
created by the police in their interaction with
the suspect (the confession), and is shaped by
32 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
27
 Green, Lim and Roche, “The Indeterminate Province: Storytelling in
Legal Theory and Legal Education” (1994) 28(2) The Law Teacher 128,
132
26
 Edwards, p. 400.
25
 Edwards, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process, p. 399.
24
 (1992) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 757, 772.
numerous decisions, mostly unrecorded and
sometimes even unconscious, to pursue certain
leads or hypotheses and drop others, to ask
certain questions rather than others, and to
look in some places but not in others.28
The overall structure of the criminal process may
itself be affected by the number of sequential decisions in
relation to the same event, each determined in accordance
with various rules. In Ireland pre-trial applications for
prohibition orders on the basis of delay have met with
differing views as between judges on the application in that
context of the presumption of innocence, to say nothing of its
implications for the subsequent trial. In P. O’C. v D.P.P.,29
for example, Denham J. expressed the view that she “…
would not apply the presumption of innocence in this type of
application”,30 whereas Murray J. was of the view that it was
… inconsistent with the fundamental rights of
a citizen… that such proceedings should
proceed on the assumption, however
contingent, that the allegations of criminal
guilt made by the prosecuting authority
against the individual citizen are true.31
The implications of altering the decision making
process in any manner to attend to the micro concerns in
different contexts, without an eye on the composite whole,
has been described by Patton as 
… individual body parts waiting to be
transplanted. Independently each appears
normal, but when combined they create a
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31
 [2000] 3 I.R. 87 at 103-104.
30
 [2000] 3 I.R. 87 at 102.
29
 [2000] 3 I.R. 87.
28
 Zuckerman, “Reducing Miscarriage of Justice” (1993) 44 N.I.L.Q. 3,
4.
horrible Frankensteinian creature. The
resulting body of law does not at all resemble
anything remotely similar to traditional
notions of fairness.32
An examination of recent constructions of fairness in
context by Irish and English courts might reveal whether
difficulties now exist for the defence of certain accused -
those involving charges of sexual offences for example? Can
we literally ‘recognise’ the concept of the innocent
paedophile priest, or fairness to the date rapist?
In that sense is fact-finding and assessment of
credibility in (certain) context(s) inimical to guaranteeing
traditional fairness (to the accused)?
II. CONSTRUCTIONS OF ‘FAIRNESS’: THE CONTEXT OF SEXUAL
OFFENCES
The cultural and legal context with regard to sexual
offences in both the Irish and English jurisdictions, has
undergone somewhat of a sea change in recent times. This
has resulted in legislative activity introducing changes in
criminal procedure, which in England led to the Youth
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which aimed to be
more cognisant of the special needs of child and vulnerable
adult witnesses.33 In Ireland, facilitation of live television link
and video testimony by witnesses, had been introduced by the
Criminal Evidence Act 1992,34 which Act also weakened the
34 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
34
 This facility was provided for children in the context of civil cases in
the Children Act, 1997, and was recently extended to intimidated or
vulnerable witnesses intimidation by the Criminal Justice Act, 1999.
Separate legal representation for rape victims is also provided for under
the Sex Offenders Act, 2001. This relates to the issue of
cross-examination on past sexual history where the accused will now face
33
 See Hoyano, “Variations on a Theme by Pigot: Special Measures
Directions for Child Witnesses” [2000] Crim. L.R. 250, 273.
32
 Patton, “Evolution in Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical Void
Where Evidentiary and Procedural Worlds Collide” (1992) 25(3) Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review 1009, 1019.
corroboration rule in relation to sexual offences, giving the
judiciary discretion as to whether to give such a warning to
the jury.35 Each of these changes emanates from what might
be categorised as ‘pro-victim’ approach - introducing changes
to facilitate prosecution and ease the giving of testimony by
witnesses - other than the accused.
In sexual offences, issues such as credibility (of the
victim) and relevance (of sexual history evidence), are
obviously core to determination of the ultimate issue at trial.
When these are in turn constructed in accordance with
judicial views of what is ‘fair’, it can be seen whether the
motivation to do justice for women and children victims
clashes with that of fair trial rights of the accused. Irish
‘rights’ adjudication in the context of (historical) sex abuse
cases, and the English House of Lords decision regarding
rape shield rules and fair trial rights in A,36 both operate in a
climate of public opinion emotionally charged in relation to
sexual offenders, particularly child sexual abuse. Whether
fact-finding itself, and judicial construction of fairness, is
then influenced by this sway from accused to victim, or
whether it results in a judicial mandate to pull against the
tides of current wisdom is worked out in relevant case law.
The latter could not offer a better occasion to test the mettle
of guarantees of fairness, or estimate the variable nature of
rules of evidence in face of policy considerations.
III. IRELAND: RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN HISTORIC SEX ABUSE CASES
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36 R. v. A. [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1546
35
 The application of the said corroboration rule in relation to
accomplices remains at full strength, but would seem to be somewhat
cosmetic in effect as evidenced by the recent Holland and Ward cases.
Moreover the application of the rules of evidence in the Special Criminal
Court suffers from the artificiality of judges instructing themselves, to be
cautious of accomplice evidence, for example, or to ignore evidence as in
the case of excluded confessions (e.g. Ward).
two sets of counsel.
In Ireland, the constitutional guarantee of fair
procedure includes that of a right to expeditious trial. In the
D.P.P. v Byrne,37 Denham J. commented that “…whereas
there is no specific constitutional right to a speedy trial, there
is an implied right to reasonable expedition under the due
process clause. An accused is entitled to have a trial free of
abuse of process.”38 Chief Justice Finlay in that same case
quoted O’Higgins C.J. in The State (Healy) v. Donoghue39 to
the effect that “…the importance of the protection of the right
to a trial with reasonable expedition is not in any way
lessened by the fact that the constitutional origins of it in our
law arose from the general provision for a trial in due course
of law rather than from a separate express provision of a right
to a speedy trial.”40
Recent resolution of the concepts of fairness and
delay in the context of prosecution of historic sex abuse in
Ireland, reveals competing tensions, both in the judicial
prioritisation and identification of the standpoints within the
criminal justice system (that of victim, accused, community,
and state); and in the treatment of historic sex abuse
allegations within the confines of the general principles of
criminal justice, particularly that of expeditious trial.
G. v. D.P.P.41 concerned 27 charges related to the
period 1967-1981 involving offences against young women.
In 1993 the accused was charged and sought leave to apply
for judicial review on grounds of lapse of time. In relation to
delay in sexual offences against young children, Chief Justice
Finlay’s comments mark the beginnings of a recognition on
36 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
41
 [1994] 1 I.R. 374. He was successful on grounds of delay.
40
 [1994] 2 I.R. 236 at 244.
39
 [1976] I.R. 325 at 375.
38
 [1994] 2 I.R. 236 at 260.
37 D.P.P. v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236. The Supreme Court in a three-two
decision in relation to a drunk driving charge rejected an application to
prohibit the trial of the offence. There had been a ten-month delay which
had led to a dismissal in the District Court.
the part of the Irish courts, that because of the feature of
dominion, in particular, an exception to the general
requirement of expeditious justice is created in these cases:
In cases in general of sexual harassment or
interference with young children, the
perpetrator may, if he or she is related to or
has a particular relationship of domination
with the child concerned, by that domination
or by threats or intimidation, prevent the child
from reporting the offence. The court asked to
prohibit the trial of a person on such offences,
even after a very long time, might well be
satisfied and justified in reaching a conclusion
that the extent to which the applicant had
contributed to the delay in the revealing of the
offences and their subsequent reporting to the
prosecution authorities meant that as a matter
of justice he should not be entitled to the
order.42
Denham J., in that same case, however, does caution
victims as to what they might seek:
A trial in a court of law is not an exercise in
vengeance but is a trial in due course of law in
the pursuit of justice on behalf of the
community…When women and children come
to the legal system it would be a disservice to
them if it were perceived that they sought
vengeance rather than the rule of law and
justice. Insofar as there are new developments
and knowledge in our society on issues that
relate to the charges laid in this case then these
matters must be dealt with in a fair and just
way by the courts.43
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 [1994] 1 I.R. 374 at 381.
42
 [1994] 1 I.R. 374 at 380.
It is clear here that the accused’s interest in fairness is
tempered by the role he may have had in causing the delay.
There also is recognition of the ‘community’s’ pursuit of
justice in a trial, and acceptance of the direct input and
influence of specialist (and popular) knowledge into the
process. Identification of the ‘community’ with victims’
rights emerges in E. O’R. v. D.P.P.,44 which concerned
charges made against the accused in March 1993, in relation
to sexual offences against three young women alleged to have
occurred between 1978-1986 (one in the period 1982-1986).
A challenge on grounds of delay was initially successful in
the High Court, where Keane J. stated that “[w]hat is beyond
doubt is that where that community right conflicts with due
process, it is the latter right which must prevail.”45
Keane J. notes that jurisprudence has developed to the
effect that in the case of charges of sexual abuse of children,
special considerations apply. These include the reluctance of
young children to accuse persons in authority,46 which
reluctance may be exacerbated by threats; and the fact that
the accused may be responsible for delay.47 In application of
the general principles identified to the facts of the case at
hand, including that of the relationship between applicant and
complainants, however, Keane J. pointed out that this must be
seen in the context of their respective ages (here the
difference being 4-11 years), and that the possibility of a
relationship of domination is markedly lessened, as the
38 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
47
 Keane J. notes that in the English case of L.P.B. (1990) 91 Cr. App. R.
359 Judge J. had stated that it would be difficult to envisage any
circumstances where delay in a complaint of child abuse would lead to
abuse of the Court process. Keane J. does not however, agree and
comments that such would be at variance with the need to have regard to
particular circumstances and the paramount nature of due process
guarantees: [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 128 at 139.
46
 In Hogan v. President of Circuit Court [1994] 2 I.R. 513 Finlay C.J.
had identified these.
45
 [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 128 at 136.
44
 [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 128.
applicant and the complainants were not living in the same
house. Hence Keane J. concluded therefore that the interests
of the accused must prevail here, although his identification
of the victim's interests with those of the public is clear: 
Whatever decision a court arrives at in a case
such as this, there is the possibility of
injustice; injustice to the complainants and the
public whom the court must protect if the
proceedings are stayed where the accused was
indeed guilty of the offences, and injustice to
the accused if he is exposed to the dangerous
ordeal of an unavoidably unfair trial. I am
satisfied that ... there is a real and serious risk
of an unfair trial that cannot be avoided by any
rulings or directions that may be given by the
trial judge.48 (Emphasis added.)
This identification of community or public interest
with those of the victim, to the detriment of the accused,
reaches its apotheosis in B. v D.P.P.49 where the defendant
was charged in 1993 in relation to offences allegedly
perpetrated against his daughter between 1963 and 1973.50
An order of prohibition on grounds of delay was refused.
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50
 On appeal, Denham J. identified the particular factors to be considered
in this case: the relationships in question, the matter of dominion, the
question of who delayed, the nature of the offence, namely alleged abuse
in the home, a possible alibi, the witnesses and the question of an
admission of guilt. In looking at each of those latter factors, dominion
received much, if not most, attention. Denham J. commented: “This
49 B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 118.
48
 [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 128 at 141-142. On appeal to the Supreme Court
(unreported judgment given on 18 March 1997), however, O’Flaherty J.
interpreted Keane J.’s decision as being one that the accused was going to
find it difficult to defend the case. O’Flaherty J. comments that this is so
in every case of this kind, even if there is no significant delay, and
therefore holds this not to be a case where the Court is entitled to prohibit
the continuation of proceedings. The effect is to prefer the continuation of
proceedings over fairness to the accused.
In reaching the decision as to whether this particular
delay between 20 to 30 years, acknowledged as “an
inordinate length of time”,51 would prejudice the fair trial of
the defendant, Denham J. places heavy emphasis on
dominion:
The events in this case are governed by what
the learned trial judge described as B’s:
‘violent, dominant and menacing personality’.
This dominance is the kernel reason for the
delay and the factor carrying most weight.52
Denham J places the community rights in opposition
to those of the accused: 
In weighing up the community’s right to
proceed with this prosecution as against the
other factors … it is clear that B has not
discharged the onus of establishing that arising
out of the delay there is a real risk that he
would not obtain a fair trial, that the trial
would be unfair as a consequence of the delay
between the dates of the alleged events and the
postponed trial.53
40 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
53
 [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 118 at 133-134.
52
 Denham J. relies here on the evidence of the psychologist in this case.
The psychologist was not, however, cross-examined on his affidavit.
[1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 118 at 128-129.
51
 [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 118 at 132.
dominion places this (and similar cases) in a special category as by the
said control the accused’s actions prevented the complainant’s taking
steps so that the prosecution could proceed within a more usual
timeframe. B is barred from arguing that the delay is unreasonable while
such dominion existed. Any delay that continued during this time of
dominion is reasonable. Consequently any prosecution commenced
within that time or within a reasonable time thereafter, is commenced
with reasonable expedition.” [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 118 at 133. In this case
the facts were that in 1982 his wife had obtained a barring order against
the defendant, and in 1991 she had died.
These decisions of the Irish courts reveal acceptance
of the role and input of the victim into the criminal trial.
Occasional vindication of the priority of the accused's rights
is only of occasional and limited effect (G,54 E. O'R.55). The
overarching theme is accommodation of prosecution and
pursuit of victims' interests, seen to be in the public/
community interest, with presumptions of dominion
prevailing over innocence rights. The popular context - one
increasingly intolerant of sexual offences particularly those
perpetrated against young children - is directly influential in
supporting the admissibility of psychological expert evidence
to explain delay and analyse victim response. Quite literally
the expert evidence is admissible because of the status of that
specialty in our community.56 Community deference ensures
judicial acceptance of that expertise to justify delay, while
credibility and fact-finding issues are similarly transposed
with assumption of the truth of the allegation overshadowing
the judicial review.57
IV. COUNTERBALANCING CERTAINTY: THE 'RE-CLAIMING' OF
CORROBORATION
If assumptions of veracity have reached an orthodoxy,
it may be inevitable that in order to express caution, the
judiciary may bring about the rehabilitation of rules relating
to suspicion of credibility and veracity in those contexts. In
the context of sexual offences, the re-emergence of rules of
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 See for example the judgment of Keane C.J. in P. O’C. v. D.P.P.
[2000] 3 I.R. 87 at 94: “…the inquiry conducted by the court which is
asked to halt the trial necessarily involves an assumption by the court that
the allegation of the victim is true.”
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 Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence, p.67: “If the
community has come to defer to professional standards on the matters in
question, the courts will normally follow suit. Medical evidence is
admissible on matters of health because we accept the authority of the
medical profession in this regard.”
55
 Unreported, High Court, Keane J., 21 December 1995.
54
 [1994] 1 I.R. 374.
evidence encapsulating scepticism and caution with regards
to the credibility or veracity of complaints or the justification
for their delayed reception, may seem unjustifiable or indeed
unwelcome. This may be particularly so where their origins
may be dubious, or the rumours of their demise have been
greatly exaggerated.58 Their re-emergence can in turn be
interpreted as typical of judicial fondness for rules of their
own creation. It should in fact be taken more seriously in
terms of the dynamics of evidentiary rules and popular
contexts or beliefs. It may in fact say more about the role and
rationale of rules of evidence than we at first appreciate. 
 The beginning of the suggestion that an assumption
of credibility of victims in cases of historic sex abuse had
hardened to an orthodoxy in Ireland is found in P.C. v.
D.P.P.59 The facts concerned the arrest of the defendant in
1995 in relation to allegations of sexual offences perpetrated
between 1982-83 and 1983-4 against a young woman. The
defendant had been the coach driver who transported
schoolgirls to a pool. His relationship with the victim had
been ended by her, when he commented that it would be legal
when she was 16, causing her to then appreciate the illegality.
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58 D.P.P. v. Finnerty [1999] 4 I.R. 364 is a case in point. The factual
scenario was that of a sexual offence: the alleged rape of a student after a
disco. A corroboration warning was given by the trial judge. On appeal it
was commented that “[n]o criticism has been, or could be, made of those
aspects of his charge.” (per Keane J. at 372-373). Finnerty illustrates how
a once crystallised perspective on credibility prevails even through
legislative change because of judicial adherence to its original precepts.
cf. Birch, “Corroboration: Goodbye to All That?” [1995] Crim L.R. 524.
In earlier consideration of reform of the corroboration requirement by s.
32(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, Birch had
expressed an appreciation of the value of Beck [1982] 1 W.L.R. 461;
[1982] 1 All E.R. 807 which creates a witness-specific obligation, arising
only if material to suggest a particular witness's evidence may be tainted
by improper motive. Those changes which have extended the
accommodation of vulnerable witnesses so that it is a concept now
beyond that of women and children do not avoid those particular
criticisms of inflexibility and complexity.
There were two periods of delay here - 1980-88 and 1988-95.
The victim had meantime gone to university and obtained a
masters degree. McGuinness J. does not find evidence here of
the type of ‘dominion’ dealt with in B’s case, and although
the experts,60 Mr. Carroll and Ms. Fitzmaurice, did describe a
type of ‘kindly’ dominion, she suggests “their views contain
an element of rationalisation by hindsight”.61 In terms of the
relationship between assumptions of dominion and the
presumption of innocence, McGuinness J. comments that
“[t]his court cannot accept that a situation of domination
exists automatically in all cases where a person is accused of
sexual offences. The presumption of innocence has to play a
part in the Court’s considerations and the court must base its
decision on the actual evidence before it.”62
In a neat juxtaposition McGuinness J. links the
current orthodoxy with that of the past: 
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 By contrast with Denham J.’s reliance on the expert’s testimony in B,
McGuinness J. is critical of the experts testifying in the case. At pages
34-35, she comments that Ms. Fitzpatrick “… had great difficulty in
elaborating with any degree of logic or scientific method what lay behind
(theories on the effect of child abuse). She was vague about the nature of
the organisation from which she had obtained her qualifications and also
about the process whereby she treated those whom she counselled… I had
difficulty in accepting that she was sufficiently qualified to be an expert
witness as to what lay behind AM’s delay in making her complaint to the
gardai in this particular case.” 
The affidavit of Mr. Alex Carroll, Senior Clinical Psychologist employed
by the Midlands Health Board, she find “extremely close both in content
and actual wording” (at 35) to the affidavit sworn by him in D. O’R. v.
D.P.P. (Unreported, High Court, Kelly J., 27 February 1997) although the
facts of the case were very different. The fact that he relied on a statement
provided by the Gardai for the victim’s history rather than going through
it with her himself, does not strike McGuinness J. “as the most desirable
way of carrying out an in-depth psychological assessment in a matter of
such crucial importance to both the complainant and the accused.” (At
36.)
…I consider that there may be a danger that B
v. D.P.P. and the unreported cases to which I
have also been referred might be taken as
authority for the proposition that in all cases
where an accused is charged with sexual abuse
of a child or young person which took place
some years ago, any claimed prejudice on
account of delay can be negatived by a claim
that the accused exercised ‘dominion’ over the
complainant.63
She then relates this directly to the equally abhorrent
automatic disbelief which pertained in relation to all sexual
offence complainants:
In years gone by, accusations of rape or any
kind of sexual assault were treated with
considerable suspicion. The orthodox view
was that accusations of rape and sexual assault
by women against men were “easy to make
and hard to disprove” and Judges were
required to give stern warnings in their charge
to the jury of the need for corroboration and
the dangers attached to convicting on the
evidence of the complainant alone.
No one to-day would support the orthodoxy of
the past and there has been a great increase in
the psychological understanding of sexual
offences generally. Nevertheless it would be
unfortunate if the discredited orthodoxy of the
past were to be replaced with an equally rigid
orthodox view that in all cases of delay in
making complaints of sexual abuse the delay
can automatically be negatived by dominion.64
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The applicant was held to have established his claim
and the order of prohibition granted.65 This was however
reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court. There Denham J.
identified the “fundamental principles” involved which had to
be “weighed and balanced by the court”66 (emphasis added)
as:
…the community's right to legal issues being
determined in the courts; to have criminal
charges processed through the courts; the right
and duty of the prosecutor to bring to the
courts for adjudication allegations of serious
child sexual abuse alleged to have taken place;
the community’s right to have its society
protected, especially its most vulnerable -
children. Also at the core of this case is the
rule of law; the right of the applicant to a fair
trial; the right of the community to the rule of
law for all, including the applicant.67
In terms of identification of standpoints within the
criminal justice system, the community’s identification with
vindication of the interests of the victim, is in contrast to the
failure to identify the interest of the community in the
accused’s right to a fair trial - the only indication of a
commonality between accused and community being in the
rule of law, which could, after all, cut both ways. Denham J.
differs from the trial judge also with regard to the presence of
dominance, and interpretation of the expert evidence,
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A number of cases where the exception was applied and so prohibition
on grounds of delay refused include D. O’R. v. D.P.P. (Unreported, High
Court, Kelly J., 27 February 1997); P.D. v. D.P.P. (Unreported, High
Court, Kelly J., 19 March 1997); D.C. v. D.P.P. & O'Leary (Unreported,
High Court, Geoghegan J., 31 October 1997). In others, it was
nonetheless granted - P.W. v. D.P.P. (Unreported, High Court, Flood J.,
27 November 1997); Fitzpatrick v. D.P.P. (Unreported, High Court,
McCracken J., 5 December 1997. 
deciding the applicant ‘may not profit from alleged illegal
actions’.68 It is regarding the question of whether the simple
efflux of time had prejudiced the applicant's chance of a fair
trial, however, that her comments are most revealing: “A trial
of charges of this type, in the circumstances described, is in
fact a trial of the credibility of the witnesses.”69 (Emphasis
added.)
Denham J. holds that the applicant had not
“distinguished his case from the growing body of case law
which has permitted delayed prosecutions for child sexual
abuse to proceed. No factor takes his case out of the norm of
this common law, or establishes that a constitutional right
will be breached.”70 (Emphasis added.)
The crucial point being missed here is that credibility
issues do change over time, as do cultural and societal norms.
While the latter is acknowledged, and hence legitimate to that
degree, the former may remain hidden and unappreciated in
its effect. It is precisely relevant that if the individual here
had been tried at the time of the alleged offences, he would
have had not only no temporal obstacles to overcome, but
avoided current cultural obstacles. The victim might also
have faced additional hurdles at that time, equally illegitimate
perhaps, but again adding to the advantages held by an
accused. If it is not right to place credibility barriers to certain
victims (as then), is it not similarly unacceptable to place
them at the door of certain accused now? Supporting the
centrality of credibility here, Keane C.J. with regard to the
issue of fair trial finds that “[h]ad this case been tried ten
years ago, the issue for the jury would essentially have been
one as to the credibility of the complainant and, if he gave
evidence, of the applicant.”71 (Emphasis added.)
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The issue of credibility and norms regarding these
cases begs the very question of how different the temporal
and popular cultural climate is now than it might have been
ten years ago? The legal and cultural context of belief
regarding these kinds of cases has greatly changed. The
prosecution task regarding such offences has been eased by
the availability - and admissibility - of expert testimony, the
removal of the corroboration requirement, and the facilitating
of witness testimony through live television link and video
provision. Moreover the public’s, and hence jury’s, view of
such cases has quite simply transformed. 
Popular wisdom, which would have leaned in the past
in the opposite direction, now leans towards pro-prosecution
and hence accommodation of the victim’s voice, at the
expense of the defendant’s claim to absence of a fair trial.
Within the confines of sexual offences, there is a current
consistency of opposition between state and individual
accused, community versus accused, victim versus accused.
The particular nature of judicial reflection, occurring
where partial sightedness may tolerate departure from
traditional norms, facilitates a judicial role which may
continue to pledge allegiance formally and visibly to such
concepts as fairness (thereby ensuring the appearance of their
continuity), despite the reality of changes on the ground.
What does this mean for the fair trial of the accused?
Ultimately is there a schism created, however, a fertile
breeding ground for future and further divergence, and
ultimate paradigm collapse?
To the extent that it goes against the grain of popular
sentiment, McGuinness J.’s decision in P. C. v D.P.P.72
serves as a litmus test for the meaning of justice as fairness in
context. Ironically (in face of its comparatively recent
legislative reform), it is this disenchantment with ‘received
wisdom’ and assumptions of verity on the part of the victim
which has manifested in a renewed argument for the
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re-introduction of corroboration. In P. O’C. v. D.P.P.,73 the
applicant was charged with five counts of indecently
assaulting PK at dates unknown from 1st January 1982 to
31st December 1983. The applicant was a violin teacher, and
the incidents allegedly took place in a music room, a
significant factor being the existence of a facility to lock
same, something that was difficult for the applicant to obtain
evidence of after the delay. In the High Court McGuinness J.
granted the order of prohibition holding that the risk of an
unfair trial here was not one which could be avoided by trial
judge direction. An appeal to the Supreme Court by the
respondent was dismissed. Denham J., agreeing that the
applicant had established prejudice as a result of delay, sees
this significantly as “an exception to the general rule”74
demonstrating the degree to which the relationship between
fairness and the right to an expeditious trial has been
inverted. She also invokes the language of ‘balance’: “The
court must achieve a balance in protecting the constitutional
rights of the accused yet weighing in the balance also the
rights of the community and the victim.”75
Of specific interest, in terms of rules of evidence, and
the impact or influence of popular culture, is the judgment of
Hardiman J. He refers to the fact that corroboration
requirement in sexual cases was abolished by s. 7 of the
Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990 and s. 27 of
the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 and comments:
It may well be that these pieces of legislation
were enacted before the prosecution of very
old offences became routine as it now is.
Cases which will be tried more than ten years
after the offences are alleged to have been
committed are very common, and a twenty to
twenty five year interval is by no means
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uncommon. My personal experience extends
to a case proposed to be prosecuted more than
46 years after the alleged offences and one has
heard of an interval of more than 52 years.
These, even the shorter periods, are
remarkable lengths of time. They appear to me
of themselves, and independently of the
respondent’s reliance on possible unspecified
“directions” of a trial judge, to require serious
consideration of what can or should be said to
a jury in these cases. At present, one cannot be
sure that any direction or warning will be
given.76
Given the effectiveness of the corroboration reform
then in relation to sexual offences, and in particular the
changing popular context in which such claims are manifest
and litigated, Hardiman J. sees a need for the mitigation of
more recent certainties regarding such claims by an
evidentiary rule of caution in favour of the accused: 
A plausible and sympathetic witness is not
necessarily telling the truth, nor a furtive and
cowed one lying. The very pressures of
litigation of this sort, so deeply personal and
perhaps central to a complainant's self worth
on the one hand and so threatening of
prolonged imprisonment, life long
stigmatisation and financial and familial
catastrophe on the other, in themselves have
the potential drastically to alter the witnesses’
presentation and effect. To permit such
prosecutions, in the absence of any scope for
corroboration or contradiction after one, two
or more decades is, to say the least, to venture
into uncharted territory where the normal
forensic safeguards are gravely attenuated.
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The process of the trial itself may be a life
altering event for one or both parties and their
families, and rarely for the better. In these
circumstances it appears to me that there is in
each case a point at which a trial in those
circumstances “puts justice to the hazard” so
that the issue of guilt or innocence is “beyond
the risk of fair litigation.”77
Another case in which corroboration is discussed is J.
O’C. v D.P.P.78 The applicant was a retired guard of 69 years
of age who was charged with 16 counts of indecent assault
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 [2000] 3 I.R. 87 at 120-121. Vindication of that case for the
‘re-claiming’ of corroboration in this context is given in J.L. v. D.P.P.
[2000] 3 I.R. 122 by McGuinness J. who says at 134 that his experiences
accord with her own in the Central Criminal Court. There is also in that
case confirmation of the applicability of the presumption of innocence:
Keane C.J. concludes: “Given the presumption of innocence to which, at
this stage of the inquiry, the applicant is entitled, I am satisfied that he has
discharged the onus…that there is a real and serious risk of an unfair
trial." (At 126-127.) McGuinness J. also states at 137-138: 
I do not accept, however, that the presumption of
innocence plays no part in the decision which must be
made by the court in this case… While for the purposes
of looking at the reasons for a complainant's delay in
reporting a sexual assault to the gardai an assumption as
to the truth of her allegations may be made, when the
court subsequently considers whether there is a real risk
of an unfair trial it is a trial based on the presumption of
innocence that is in question.
By this approach the court will hold the balance
between a situation in which it would be impossible to
try any accused of sexual offences against children
where delay in reporting had occurred, and the equally
undesirable situation where all persons accused of
sexual offences against children would have to face trial
no matter how long the time was which had elapsed
since the alleged offence and no matter how great was
the danger of an unfair trial.
between 1974 and 1978, when the complainant C. O’S. was
between 10 and 13 years of age. Her father was a retired
Sergeant, and the families were next door neighbours at the
time of the alleged offences. The applicant’s wife had died in
1993 and so was unavailable to give valuable evidence
regarding frequency of visits etc. The applicant suffered from
ill health and medical evidence suggested he would have
great difficulty in coping with the stress of a trial. A
consultant psychologist gave evidence that the delay of C.
O’S. was ‘reasonable’. The President of the High Court had
accepted that a number of factors here militated against a fair
trial.
On appeal, Keane C.J. in the Supreme Court pointed
out that the court must decide whether as a matter of
probability, assuming the complaint to be truthful, the delay
in making it was referable to the accused’s (sic) own actions.
Given the respective ages, and the fact that the accused was
not only considerably older, but a person in authority, he
states that this was classically a case where the child might
not be willing to make a complaint.79 With regard to the
hierarchy of interests here, Keane C.J. points out that “[e]ven
in cases where, assuming, as one must do for the purpose of
the application, that the complaints are true, the court finds
that the delay is essentially due to the applicant's own
conduct, there remains the paramount necessity to ensure that
the applicant receives a trial in due course of law.”80 He finds
the President of the High Court, however, was not correct in
drawing inferences that the degree of prejudice here was such
as would lead to a real and serious risk of an unfair trial. With
regard to the court's approach to proceedings such as these,
Keane C.J. is clear that “…the court must proceed on the
assumption that the allegations are well founded and, to that
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extent only and solely in the context of these specific
proceedings, the presumption of innocence does not apply.”81
Murphy J. stated that, in the absence of delay on the
part of the state or prosecution, the onus was on the applicant
to prove that a fair trial is impossible. This was not done here,
and so he also dismissed the application. Hardiman J., in a
dissenting judgment, points that the inability to test evidence
in sex abuse cases due to lapse of time is compounded by two
factors: no general requirement of corroboration, and the
practical pressure on the defendant to answer questions. With
regard to the special category status of such cases, Hardiman
J. endorses this for another reason, that of “…the chilling and
destructive effect which a long lapse of time may have on the
ability even of an innocent person to defend himself...”82 It is
with regard to the presumption of innocence, however, that
his disagreement with the jurisprudence to date is most
profound:
I cannot subscribe to the proposition that the
presumption of innocence applies only in the
actual trial of criminal proceeding or is
capable of suspension for any purpose relating
to the trial, such as the disposal of injunctive
proceedings like as the present ones.
…[T]here is…no basis whatever for assuming
the truth of the allegations against the accused,
prior to conviction, for any purpose or in any
proceedings. This assumption, even for a
limited purpose, is a much greater step than
merely not applying the presumption, great as
that is in itself. It involves assuming the
contrary.83
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Hardiman J. reiterates that the real issue is whether
there is a real risk that the applicant will not receive a fair
trial. In that he is ad idem with the others, but begs to differ
in so far as he does not see it necessary “…to assume for any
purpose that the allegations of the complainant are true.”84
Unlike the rest of the court, he would grant the order of
prohibition. Criticism of the expert witness testimony, which
is so much a feature of these cases, also emerges, with
Hardiman J. finding the nature of the examination by the
psychologist here to have been ‘gravely inadequate’.85 Expert
witnesses here in both the presentation of evidence and
recognition of their area of research or expertise, meet with
sharp differences in judicial views of their testimony (see for
example the contrasting views of McGuinness J. and Denham
J. in P.C. v D.P.P.86 infra). In N.C. v D.P.P.87 this was
manifest in the actual unavailability of the hypnotist, under
whose ministrations the complainant revived her memory of
the events forming the basis of the complaint (this also
triggering the other complaints made by her sister). The trial
would have taken place 40 years and 10 months after the first
alleged assault. Hardiman J., granting the application to
restrain prosecution, pointed out that there was therefore no
effective test or control of the mechanism of alleged
recovery, rendering this a situation “fraught with the risk of
unfairness”.
In these instances of judicial review of Irish historic
sexual abuse cases there is a clear clash of interests: justice,
in terms of fair trial, versus criminal prosecution, seen now in
terms of victims’ rights. On each occasion, almost without
exception, the victim trumps the accused. Exceptional
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provision in sexual offence cases on grounds of delay
arguably comes close to prejudicing the presumption of
innocence of the accused, as the applicability of the latter is
the subject of judicial dispute. From this accommodation of
exceptional provision in light of victim need comes the
identification of the said victim with the community and
state, and its opposition to the individual now accused. The
triumphing of victims’ rights on almost every occasion,
transposes the previous position of non-belief of victims to
absolute and automatic belief. There is a related replacement
or juxtaposition of the accused’s presumption of innocence,
with a presumption of guilt. On each such occasion the
choice is facilitated by the lack of appeal of the accuseds -
respectively the ‘folk devils’ of their day. Occasional
vindication of their rights serves only to illustrate the overall
vulnerable nature of the fairness guarantee.
In terms of historic sex abuse cases however, there is
evidence that the Irish courts may have begun to turn full
circle: the exception carved out to the principle of expeditious
justice, invoking assumptions of credibility and proof to the
detriment of the accused's fair trial rights, and the
presumption of innocence, has turned to judicial rejection of
received wisdom manifest in renewed grounds for
corroboration and greater scrutiny of expert testimony.
V. ENGLAND: THE RAPE SHIELD RULE AND FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS
A parallel development which is interesting for
comparative purposes here is the impact of the Human Rights
Act’s fairness requirements on rape-shield rules in England.
The tenor of changes introduced by the Youth Justice
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999 is one which makes
particularised provision for vulnerable witnesses. Not all
witnesses qualify for such consideration however. As Di
Birch points out88 the accused is excluded from taking
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 Birch, “A Better Deal for Vulnerable Witnesses?” [2000] Crim. L.R.
223, 224: “Vulnerable witnesses may be the victims of ideologies and
unhelpful societal assumptions, so that an effective strategy involves
advantage of any of the ‘special measures’, as “[t]his is an
Act which leaves us in no doubt where its sympathies lie.”89
In manifesting an overwhelming concern with
witnesses aside from the accused, the provisions of that Act
re-enforce the notion that it is only they who are worthy of
(extra) consideration or help.
Despite occasional popular manifestations of concern
for those accused or suspected of sexual offences,90 the
general tenor remains one cognisant of victims’ needs in
sexual offences, and their accommodation through the
medium of the criminal justice system. In R. v A.,91 the House
of Lords had an opportunity to directly assess this issue of
victim or witness accommodation in the context of fair trial
rights of the accused mandated by the Human Rights Act.
The central concern here was the accommodation of the rape
shield provisions under the Youth Justice and Criminal
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 Within popular culture, cases such as that of Roy Shuttleworth and
David Jones which have recently raised the issue of miscarriage of justice
in situations particularly where rules of adjudication and investigation
have been adapted for particular circumstances. Here the practice of
police ‘trawling’ (multiplying the number of complaints against an
individual and facilitating their subsequent admission) in the context of
child sex abuse charges was found complicit. See “Betrayal of the
carers”, The Observer, 10 December 2000: former care worker David
Jones was cleared of child sex charges after police trawling. See also
Rose and Hornec, “Abuse Witch-Hunt Traps”, The Observer, 26
November 2000, at p.18 (regarding Roy Shuttleworth).
Jenny McEwan states that this ignores the possibility that the plight of a
learning disabled or otherwise vulnerable defendant may have to be
addressed: “The European Commission and Court on Human Rights have
already expressed the view in Thompson that the traditional English
criminal court is not a forum where a juvenile can be given a fair trial. It
may only be a matter of time before it is found that the same applies also
to vulnerable defendants who are intimidated or bewildered by
adversarial criminal proceedings.” McEwan, “In Defence of Vulnerable
Witnesses: The Youth and Criminal Evidence Act 1999” [2000] 4(1)
International Journal of Evidence & Proof 1, 30.
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challenging the culture as well as the law”.
Evidence Act, 1999 with the concept of fair trial guaranteed
to the accused under the ECHR. 
Section 41 of the 1999 Act prohibited the giving of
evidence and cross examination about any sexual behaviour
of the complainant except with leave of the court. Leave
could be given in very limited circumstance: where the sexual
behaviour is alleged to have taken place ‘at about the same
time’ as that before the court (s. 41(3)(b)) and where it is ‘so
similar’ to that before the court that it cannot be explained as
coincidence. (s. 41(3)(c)). Neither of these would avail the
defendant in this case.92 The legislative objective in
introducing the rape shield provisions was identified as that
of eliminating the ‘twin myths’, i.e. that if the complainant
had had sexual intercourse with third parties she would be
more likely to have consented to intercourse with the
defendant; and that such a complainant would be less worthy
of belief than a woman of unblemished chastity. In terms of
the result (aside from the implications of the court’s
avoidance of a declaration of incompatibility), superficially,
it might appear that the fair trial considerations - and in
particular fairness to the accused - won out, as the decision of
the majority of the court in A was that evidence of the
complainant’s past sexual history with the accused should not
be excluded if it is “so relevant to the issue of consent that to
exclude it would endanger the fairness of the trial under
article 6 of the convention.”93
At first glance this appears to resemble the occasions
of the Irish courts’ skepticism of pro-victim accommodation
or prosecution orientated changes. A closer examination of
the language of the House of Lords judgments, however,
indicates that the court was generally comfortable with the
notion of ‘balancing’ the accused’s interests with those of the
interests of the victim and society.
Lord Steyn, for instance, in his judgment determines:
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 The same issue was arising in 13 other criminal cases.
It is well established that the guarantee of a
fair trial under article 6 is absolute…The only
balancing permitted is in respect of what a
concept of a fair trial entails: here account
may be taken of the familiar triangulation of
interests of the accused, the victim and
society. In this context proportionality has a
role to play.94
In similar vein, Lord Hutton identifies the principal
objectives of a criminal trial, invoking a third in the context
of rape:
One is that a defendant should not be
convicted of the crime with which he is
charged when he has not committed it. The
other is that a defendant who is guilty of the
crime with which he is charged should be
convicted. But where the crime charged is that
of rape, the law must have a third objective
which is also of great importance: it is to
ensure that the woman who complains that she
has been raped is treated with dignity in court
and is given protection against
cross-examination and evidence which invades
her privacy unnecessarily and which subjects
her to humiliating questioning and accusations
which are irrelevant to the charge against the
defendant.95
Later on he equates the position of defendant and
victim in a criminal trial where he refers to “…the need to
achieve both the objective of protecting an innocent
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defendant and the objective of protecting a woman
complainant.”96
There is evident recognition then of the role of the
victim in the criminal trial and acceptance of their standpoint
and interest. While this may be unproblematic in itself,
evidence of the ‘public interest’ influence on judicial
construction of fairness is more disquieting. This is found
where the role of the legislature is invoked to give credence
to the goal of accommodating victims’ interests. Lord Hutton
in particular refers to the earlier decision of Brown v. Stott,97
where consideration was given to the qualification of a right
under Article 6, by considerations of the public interest in the
need to address the high incidence of injury and deaths on the
road through misuse of motor vehicles: “Limited
qualification of these rights is acceptable if reasonably
directed by national authorities towards a clear and proper
public objective and if representing no greater qualification
than the situation calls for.”98
Lord Hutton, although underlining the pre-eminence
of the accused’s rights, and the limitations on the public
interest here, nonetheless acknowledges the latter's role
concluding that “…the right of a defendant to call relevant
evidence, where the absence of such evidence may give rise
to an unjust conviction, is an absolute right which cannot be
qualified by considerations of public interest, no matter how
well-founded that public interest may be.”99
Although vindicated on this occasion in A., therefore,
a fissure in the pre-eminence of the rights of the accused is
identifiable in so far as the public interest - closely identified
with legislative action - is concerned. The future potential of
such reasoning is evident from the judgment of Lord Hope,
58 Judicial Studies Institute Journal [2:1
99
 Per Lord Hutton at para 161.
98
 [2001] 2 W.L.R. 817 per Lord Bingham at 836.
97
 [2001] 2 W.L.R. 817.
96
 Per Lord Hutton at para 143.
where he finds the legislation compatible with Article 6.100
Lord Hope constructs a ‘balance’ “…between the right of the
defendant to a fair trial and the right of the complainant not to
be subjected to unnecessary humiliation and distress when
giving evidence.”101 He invokes the terrorism precedent of Ex
parte Kelibene102 to assert that “…it is appropriate in some
circumstances for the judiciary to defer, on democratic
grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body as to
where the balance is to be struck between the rights of the
individual and the needs of society.”103
There could not be greater proof of the power of the
public mood than in this use of a terrorism precedent: it
represents another context where the public feelings invoked
deem rights diminution acceptable. The point is, however,
that once the fissure is extant, the question of what is found to
justify derogation depends then precisely on the public mood.
The fact that one may feel comfortable with the group
identified to benefit from the public interest in victims’
rights, as in the case of rape victims perhaps, should not hide
the broader truth that the loss is that of all defendants, and the
corresponding strength of the legislature not confined to areas
of which we might approve. In fact the unattractiveness of the
defendant may be a sure sign of his merit in attracting all the
safeguards we might give. Ultimately the English courts have
demonstrated an appreciation of fair trial rights in A., but it is
one loaded with the potential for exception. Despite the
outcome in A., one could well predict a series of decisions in
which the English courts will now balance rights to the effect
of accommodating victims’ rights, while simultaneously
2001] The Culture of Decision-Making 59
103
 Per Lord Hope at para 58 referring to R v. D.P.P. Ex parte Kelibene
[2000] 2 A.C. 326.
102
 [2000] 2 A.C. 326.
101
 Per Lord Hope at para 51.
100
 Lord Hope effects this without having recourse to the strained
interpretations availed of under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998,
by the other Law Lords.
diminishing those of the accused. The overt use of the
concepts of legitimate aim and proportionality104 to justify
interference with the Article 6 (implied) right is evident in a
number of these judgments.105 Lord Hope’s in Brown v. Stott
is particularly noteworthy in its invocation of a Canadian
concept that a right is not absolute but “contextually
sensitive”.106 This Lord Hope equates as similar to the
European Court’s examination of issues as to legitimate aim
and proportionality. He refers to other jurisdictions in Europe
with similar provisions and concludes, “…the restriction is
regarded as having a legitimate aim and as striking the right
balance between the general interest of the community and
the fundamental rights of the individual”.107
Constructions of ‘public interest’, balancing exercises,
and determinations of credibility and hence fact finding are
demonstrably affected by the public winds of change. Judicial
statements of principle and rights however conceal that
dimension to justice. This facilitates a process of change
which imperceptibly, but crucially, changes the nature of
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‘fairness’ or ‘due process’ in a context where all-pervasive is
the assumption that these remain the same.
Ashworth108 has made evident his dislike of the
practice of ‘balancing’ rights in the context of such
proceedings:
The scourge of many debates about criminal
justice policy is the concept of ‘balance’…
The principled approach to criminal justice…
is explicitly normative. It sets out various
rights and principles that ought to be
safeguarded… One consequence of the
Human Rights Bill 1998 will be to bring rights
into a central position.
With regard to assessments of Article 6 fair trial rights
and the particular ‘balancing’ exercises beloved of members
of the judiciary, Ashworth reminds us that Article 6 is a
strong right - unlike say Articles 8-11 which are qualified
rights. Hence his warning with regard to this kind of
reasoning in that context:109
Any argument to the effect that a right implied
into Article 6 should be restricted out of
deference to the “public interest” should be
required to be at least as strong, and probably
stronger, than a similar argument for justifying
interference with one of the qualified rights
under Articles 8-11. The right to a fair trial
and its constituent elements should surely be
given a greater weight, in such
calculations…[T]he Strasbourg decisions refer
frequently to one doctrine …that no restriction
should be such as to “destroy the very essence
of the right”. This doctrine places distinct
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limits on “public interest” balancing of the
kind that some British judges have found
attractive.
Ashworth makes the point that to accept that these
rights are not absolute is “not to concede that they may be
‘balanced away’ by being compared with a general public
interest and put in second place.”110
Although the development in A. appears to endorse
traditional pre-accused’s rights (such as untrammelled
cross-examination), closer examination reveals the potential
for ‘public interest’ (as legislatively construed) incursions.
‘Fair trial’ rights prove vulnerable and protection of the
accused is diminished, in the context of fact finding
particularly where media pressure and popular wisdom
influence and indeed overwhelm assessments of credibility
and hence guilt.
VI. COUNTER-CULTURE: COUNTER-BALANCING POPULAR WISDOM
WITH A PRO-DEFENCE BIAS.
Within the Irish and English contexts, there is some
evidence of judicial scepticism regarding recent changes to
criminal procedure to accommodate witnesses, other than the
accused, in terms of implications for fair trial rights. On the
other hand, prosecutorial bias is evident in the legislature's
and popular view regarding certain offences - now including
those of sexual offences and historic sex abuse claims.111
In Ireland, Hardiman J. has counseled caution in face
of historic sex abuse claims, and McGuinness J. identified a
parallel response equally reprehensible to that previously
applicable to sex abuse victims - now affecting the accused.
The construction of fairness in sexual offences may have
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resulted in the accused’s presumption of innocence being
usurped by a presumption of guilt. A possible solution
emerges in P. O’C.112 which revives a rule of evidence
cautious of credibility (corroboration), in a context where a
judicially carved exception to expeditiousness in cases of
historic sex abuse was predicated on victims’ needs.
‘Fairness’ in the House of Lords decision in A.113 operated to
include evidence previously excluded under legislation with a
victims’ rights mandate. Yet in A. the House of Lords also
invoked the triple danger of opposition of the accused and
victims’ rights in the criminal justice system; deferring to
popular legislative sentiment; and raised the specter of future
‘contextual sensitivity’ in rights evaluation.
From one perspective, both Irish and English case-law
reveal change being stymied by fairness arguments. From
another, fairness is revealed, as a moveable feast dependent
on legislative desire and popular wisdom, even to the extent
of influencing judicial construction of fair trial needs in
context. What is common to judicial reasoning in both
jurisdictions, is ultimate rejection of popular sentiment -
although one might query how strongly in A. Certainly one
might question whether the mechanism for implementation
used - judicial mandates regarding fairness - provide an
adequate vindication of an accused’s fair trial rights.
While the decision in A. in England might be taken as
a positive reflection on the position of the accused’s fair trial
rights, the European precedents invoked in Forbes,114 Brown
v. Stott,115 and Kebilene,116 where Murray117 is consistently
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preferred to Saunders,118 indicate that those decisions
vindicating fair trial rights are purely symbolic. Article 6 may
not offer any protection for those who are seen as abhorrent -
the victims of current witch-hunts and collective wisdom.
There has certainly been ample evidence in both jurisdictions
of accommodation of victims’ rights, at the expense of those
of the accused. This is perhaps understandable. It is human
nature to want to be on the side of the angels, but there must
be a recognition amongst those of us concerned with criminal
law, that that is a moveable feast, and that for criminal
lawyers it is with the devils we ride. The solution here may
not lie however in rights discourse, and the dictates of fair
trial, but in our approach to fact finding itself. The solution
may indeed lie in the direction of judgments like Hardiman
J.’s, re-invigorating corroboration arguments to drown the
rush of certainty and belief. Taking the current popular
culture and context into account, one can certainly argue for a
pro-accused approach in interpreting the ‘story’ of a criminal
trial. This is particularly so in relation to any crime that is
currently the subject of a perceived ‘crisis’ or ‘witch-hunt’,
where perpetrators are thereby distanced from all fact finders:
jury, judge, legislator, and public. These cases arguably
require an adjustment in terms of credibility issues, as at a
fundamental level we cannot recognise their ‘story’ - it
literally makes no sense in equal measure as the opposing tale
does. To make such an assumption may undoubtedly be
uncomfortable for us as a society collectively and
individually - as we do not like these people and are not ‘like’
them. On the other hand, not to do so, and to risk using the
criminal process to draw that distinction is not just wrong - it
is a travesty and a perversion of justice. It is surely to those
whom we regard as perverse that we owe most, or we pervert
not only the course of justice, but by definition, ourselves.
The rules of evidence are often criticised as being of
another climate or time. It may be, however, that it is
precisely when they reject the certainties or tenor of our own
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culture and values, that they are necessary to counter-balance
our prejudices as fact-finders.
To leave matters subject to the exercise of judicial
discretion on an individual basis (as reform of the
corroboration rules has done), or subject to community
feeling, manifest through the jury on the occasion when they
feel so moved, will most likely result in the issue being
determined by non-identification with the (victim or)
accused: prostitute, drug dealer, paedophile, rapist - those
currently furthest from us and so ‘other’. Avoidance of such
‘scape goating’ and arbitrary justice, requires rooting the
rules of evidence and fact-determination in a pro-accused,
pro-defence rights bias, which may be the only guarantee of
justice in the aftermath of media witch hunts. Reliance on
judicial watchfulness alone - even with an increased rights
mandate - does not prove a sufficient or, despite the evidence
of the English and Irish courts’ periodic breaks with
legislative and public consensus, constant guarantee.
The inevitable constraints of fact determination and
application of evidentiary rules - not least the adjudication of
fairness - require more than is promised by a general judicial
mandate of fair trial. An overarching remit, applicable in all
contexts, but most particularly those of current ‘popular’
concern, to vindicate the accused’s rights, through application
of the rules of evidence and directing finders of fact to err on
the side of the accused, may indeed be a pre-condition to
justice.
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